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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant Holiday
Rent-A-Car claiming for personal injuries; Holiday

filed a

third-party action against Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba
Airport Shuttle claiming breach of a contract to procure
liability insurance and seeking indemnification against
plaintiff's claim.

Plaintiff entered into a settlement with

Holiday, andf through assignment, has succeeded to its claim
against Airport Shuttle for breach of contract.
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Contrary to the implication of plaintiff-appellant's
brief herein, there are only two parties involved in this
appeal.

The interests of Holiday Rent-A-Car, Flexi-Lease Inc.,

defendants Maw and defendants Lingard have been fully assigned
to plaintiff Patricia Christiansen.
178-180.

See copy of assignment Tr.

In this proceeding, plaintiff seeks to enforce these

claims against Airport Shuttle.
The Home Insurance Company, listed by plaintiffappellant as an "unnamed" defendant is not a party to this
proceeding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On November 28, 1983, Judge Scott Daniels entered
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff as assignee of defendant
Holiday and against third-party defendants/respondents Airport

Shuttle in the amount of $15,000.00. Judge Daniels1 judgment
denied plaintiff's motion for entry of judgment against Airport
Shuttle in the amount of $246,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmation of Judge Daniels'
judgment of November 28, 19 83.
FACTS
This case arises from plaintiff's claims for personal
injuries resulting from an accident which occurred on the
premises of Holiday Rent-A-Car ("Holiday") near the Salt Lake
City International Airport in Salt Lake City, Utah.

At the

timef plaintiff was employed by third-party defendants Howell
and Hinckley, dba Airport Shuttle Parking ("Airport Shuttle").
Airport Shuttle and Holiday maintained their offices in the
same building.

The building was leased by Airport Shuttle,

which in turn sublet a portion of it to Holiday.
The accident occurred on February 29, 1980f when
plaintiff walked into the Holiday portion of the building and
stepped into an open manhole.

The manhole had been temporarily

uncovered by Holiday employees.

Plaintiff suffered no broken

bones but complained of bruising and soft-tissue injuries.
Plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery for pain in the cervical
and lumbar areas of her back and pain in her leg.
Plaintiff's condition was treated conservatively with
physical therapy and medication.

Immediately after the

accident, she was treated by a chiropractor and then went to an

orthopedic surgeon.

Upon directions from the orthopod, she

followed a program of physical therapy at Holy Cross Hospital
through April of 1980. She had occasional follow-up physical
therapy treatments into early 1981. Her medical bills for all
medical services at the time of settlement herein totals
$5f0 29.58.

Approximately one-half of this amount was made up

of physical therapy charges at Holy Cross Hospital. Approximately $1,200.00 of the amount was for psychiatric care
received in 1982 at the LDS Hospital Pain Clinic.

(Tr. 22-87;

480.)
Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in negligence
against Holiday (Tr. 2-3), in June of 1981.

In February of

1982f Holiday filed a third-party complaint over and against
Airport Shuttle claiming that as part of the terms of their
sublease agreement with Airport Shuttle, Airport Shuttle was
obligated to procure premises liability insurance coverage for
Holiday, which would have covered plaintiff's claims. The
complaint alleged that no such coverage had been procured.
(Tr. 108-111.)

Airport Shuttle in its response to the third-

party complaint denied the existence of such an agreement.
(Tr. 118-119.)
The case was bifurcated for trial pursuant to order
of Judge Croft on September 30f 1982.

(Tr. 163-165)

Under

Judge Croft's order, the question of whether the sublease
required Airport Shuttle to obtain liability insurance for
Holiday

was to be tried October 5, 1982; the issues raised by

the original complaint to be handled subsequently.

Trial by

jury was conducted on the contract issue of the third-party
complaint on October 5 and 6, 1982f Judge David Dee, presiding. The single issue of whether Airport Shuttle contracted
to extend their own liability insurance for the benefit of
Holiday was submitted to the jury.

The jury found in favor of

Holiday.
Judge Dee entered judgment determining that Airport
Shuttle had entered a contract with Holiday pursuant to which
Airport Shuttle was obligated to have Holiday

insured under

the Airport Shuttle Business Owners1 Insurance Policy.
Pursuant to stipulation, Judge Dee further awarded a judgment
against Airport Shuttle in favor of Holiday in the amount of
$3,500.00 for attorneys1 fees incurred by Holiday in defending
against plaintiff's original complaint herein.

Judge Dee's

order was restrictive and reserved all other questions of any
further obligation of Airport Shuttle for later determination.
(Tr. 293-297.)
SETTLEMENT
This issue is complicated by the fact that prior to
the trial before Judge Dee, plaintiff and Holiday entered into
a settlement agreement.

This settlement agreement is a part of

the court's record (Tr. 190-193.)
Under the settlement agreement, Holiday Rent-A-Car
paid $15,000.00 to plaintiff and assigned whatever rights it
may have had against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff.

Holiday was

relieved of any further obligations under the complaint.

The

settlement agreement further provides that should plaintiff as
assignee of Holiday's rights, succeed in recovering any amount
from Airport Shuttle under the assignment, $10,000.00 of the
$15,000.00 payment will be refunded to Holiday.
The settlement then contains additional provisions
contemplating the entry of a judgment in excess of $15,000.00
against Holiday.

It was agreed, however, that plaintiff would

not execute on this judgment against Holiday but would only
seek to recover it from Airport Shuttle.

These provisions were

designed to create a large windfall judgment against Airport
Shuttle which would be assigned to plaintiff.
The settlement agreement provided that plaintiff
would submit her evidence of damage to a judge who would set a
damage figure for her and enter judgment against Holiday in
that amount.

(Tr. 191.)

to pay the judgment.

Defendant Holiday would have no duty

Plaintiff contemplated attempting to

recover the judgment from Airport Shuttle or an insurance
company.
Plaintiff and defendant Holiday scheduled a hearing
before the law and motion judge, Judge Phillip Fishier on
October 1, 1982, to seek a damage determination from Judge
Fishier.

No formal notice of this hearing was given to Airport

Shuttle and Airport Shuttle's attorney was only notified at the
last minute by a telephone call from the attorney for Holiday,
Dale Lambert.

(Tr. 478-479.)

Prior to the hearing before Judge Fishier, plaintiff
and Holiday executed their settlement agreements in full.
Judge Fishier refused to take any testimony on the merits of
plaintiff's claim for her damages.

Plaintiff's various

affidavits purporting to outline the dollar value of her
damages were filed, but not received as exhibits by Judge
Fishier.

(Minute entry Judge Fishier, Tr. 159.)

Judge

Fishier's minute entry states that the issues of proximate
cause, negligence and damages raised by plaintiff's complaint
would have to be heard at trial.
Thereafter, Judge Fishier entered a judgment in favor
of plaintiff against Holiday pursuant to stipulation in the
amount of $246,033.08. This stipulation to an amount of
damages by Holiday was not required by their settlement
agreement.

It was voluntarily entered into after they had

relieved themselves of further responsibility in the case by
entering into the settlement agreement.

It was an effort to

"set up" Airport Shuttle.
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Following the bifurcated trials, Airport Shuttle
moved for summary judgment in the case determining that it was
indebted to Holiday

and by assignment to plaintiff in the

amount of $15,000.00, the sum which Holiday had been required
to pay in order to settle this lawsuit.

(Tr. 297-298.)

For

the purposes of the motion, Airport Shuttle did not contest the
claim made by plaintiff that it had breached its obligation to

obtain insurance coverage for the benefit of Holiday Rent-A-Car
that would have covered plaintifffs injury.

Plaintiff filed a

cross-motion seeking an award of damages in the amount of the
stipulated judgment of $246,033.08.

(Tr. 439-440.)

In support

of her motion, plaintiff filed several affidavits attempting to
give validity to the very large judgment figure.
In response, Airport Shuttle filed the counteraffidavit of Robert L. Stevens (Tr. 476-484)

demonstrating

that:
1. Approximately a month and a half prior to the
entry of the settlement at a pre-trial settlement conference
before Judge Croft, plaintiffs had offered to settle their
claim for the sum of $85,000.00, which figure was rejected by
both Holiday and Airport Shuttle who made a combined responsive
offer of settlement of $15,000.00.
2.

Plaintifffs attorneys had represented to

attorneys for Airport Shuttle and Holiday that her total
medical special damages as of October, 1982, were $5,029.58;
approximately $2,500.00 of which consisted of physical therapy,
approximately $1,200.00 of which consisted of psychiatric care
and the remainder of which consisted of a series of doctors and
chiropractors.
3.

At least one of plaintiff's doctors, Dr. David

Howe, in his deposition, indicated his assessment of plaintiff's problems as "functional overlay" which he defined
generally as psychosomatic problems.

4.

The attorney for Holiday, Dale Lambert, had

commissioned an independent medical examination of plaintiff by
an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Gene R. Smith, who concluded that
plaintiff had suffered little or no physical injury as a result
of her claimed accident.
5.

That in Robert L. Stevens1 opinion as an

experienced litigation attorney in Salt Lake City, the stipulated settlement of $246,000.00 entered in this matter as a
judgment against Holiday Rent-A-Car bore no relation of any
kind to plaintiff's injuries and was hundreds of thousands of
dollars more than any reasonable or fair settlement that would
have been reached in good faith in this matter.
No objection was made to any of the facts contained
in this affidavit and no responsive affidavit disputing these
facts was filed.

In their reply memorandum, Airport Shuttle

took the position that the stipulated judgment of nearly a
quarter of a million dollars was excessive on its face and a
patent sham and should be rejected by the court.

(Tr. 446-

460.) Airport Shuttle also took the alternative position that
if the court was not disposed to ignore the stipulated judgment
as a sham, Airport Shuttle should be allowed the opportunity to
conduct discovery and participate in open hearing as to the
reasons and support for this very large figure.

(Tr. 457-460.)

The cross-motions for summary judgment were heard
before Judge Daniels and he issued a memorandum decision on
September 23, 1983.

(Tr. 485-488.)

Judge Daniels determined

that Airport Shuttle, as a partnership of individuals and not
an insurance company, was not liable for the "huge" judgment
but was only liable for the actual damages to Holiday which
were $15,000.00.
Judge Daniels granted plaintiffs a second hearing on
the issue and entered an order reaffirming his memorandum
decision in determining that if Airport Shuttle breached its
obligation to secure insurance which would have protected
Holiday in this case, judgment against Airport Shuttle is to be
awarded in the amount of $15,000.00).

(Tr.

500-501.)

Judge

Daniels, having reached this conclusion, found it unnecessary
to deal with the question of collusion and sham in connection
with the quarter million dollar stipulated judgment.
Plaintiff thereafter filed her notice of appeal
herein.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT REGARDING ARGUMENT
Plaintiff/appellant's brief at pages 15 through 25
and at numerous other locations contains repeated references to
suppositions and speculations regarding insurance coverage for
Airport Shuttle in this case and regarding Airport Shuttle's
legal representation.

These suppositions are confused,

misleading and flatly inaccurate. Suggestions are raised
without foundation which have no relevance to this appeal
proceeding and no basis in fact.
Airport Shuttle objects to the inclusion of this
material in plaintiff's brief.

Under authority of Young v.

Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108 433

P.2d 846.(Utah 1967), the con-

sideration of whether liability insurance is available or not
available to Airport Shuttle is irrelevant and prejudicial to a
fair consideration of the issues at hand.

Plaintiff's attempt

to interject such considerations before this court is
improper.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IF THE INSURANCE POLICY EXTENDS COVERAGE TO HOLIDAY
AS PLAINTIFF CLAIMS, THE COMPLAINT AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The third-party complaint filed herein against
Airport Shuttle seeks damages arising from Airport Shuttle's
breach of an obligation to procure certain liability insurance.
Plaintiff, as the assignee of Holiday, stands in Holiday's
shoes and succeeds to its interests under this third-party
complaint.
Plaintiff, however, takes the position in its brief
herein, and has repeatedly argued in the court below, that
Airport Shuttle did, in fact, secure insurance for the benefit
of Holiday through The Home Insurance Company.

If such is the

case, Airport Shuttle did not breach any obligation to Holiday
and the third-party complaint should be dismissed.
At Point I of the argument section of plaintiff's
brief, plaintiff claims that Airport Shuttle personnel did, in
fact, procure insurance for Holiday Rent-A-Car's benefit
through The Home Insurance Company.

This claim is maintained

throughout all of the arguments and factual statement of
plaintiff's brief.
It was the belief of Rex Howell, Harold Hinckley, and
Airport Shuttle that such insurance coverage for Holiday was
not contemplated by their contract.

Airport Shuttle employees

made no effort to get such insurance coverage (See Trial
Testimony of Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell Tr. 534-590.)
Contrary to the implication in plaintiff's brieff Airport
Shuttle's attorney made no representation to any court herein
that he believed The Home insurance policy covered Holiday.
Airport Shuttle has not contested the allegation in the
third-party complaint that no insurance was obtained for the
benefit of Holiday.
Plaintiff, nevertheless, has persisted in her claim
that insurance coverage does extend to Holiday as a result of
Airport Shuttle's actions. Clearly plaintiff cannot have it
both ways.

Either Airport Shuttle breached its contract and

there is no insurance or there is insurance and Airport Shuttle
is not in breach and not liable.
Airport Shuttle submits that if plaintiff has
determined to her own satisfaction that insurance coverage does
exist, then it would be inequitable to allow her to recover
against Airport Shuttle in this action based upon breach of
contract.

POINT II
JUDGE DANIELS1 DECISION REJECTING THE $246,000.00
JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE AND LIMITING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
TO THE $15,000.00 OF ACTUAL DAMAGE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Since Holiday was able to settle plaintiff's case as
against it for the amount of $15,000.00, the lack of insurance
available to Holiday has only caused damages of $15,000.00
worth.
The fact that after settling out of the case, Holiday
voluntarily entered into a contrived judgment which
was beyond and outside the requirements of its settlement
agreement, in the amount of $246,000.00, can have no relevance
or bearing on Airport Shuttle's obligations.
A. THE BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PROCURE INSURANCE
ENTITLES THE AGGRIEVED PARTY TO COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES
ACTUALLY CAUSED, IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE BREACHING PARTY AS
AN INSURER.
Under the facts of this case as determined at trial,
Airport Shuttle entered into a contract with Holiday under
which it was obligated to procure liability insurance.

For the

purposes of its motion for summary judgments, Airport Shuttle
conceded that it had breached this obligation and procured no
such insurance; and that had it purchased such insurance, that
insurance would have extended coverage to plaintiff's claimed
damages.
A contract to procure insurance is no different from
any other contract that may be entered into between two

independent parties. Any damages resulting from a breach are
to be measured by the traditional contract measure of damages.
The damages in general, for the breach of a
contract are properly measured by the amount
necessary to place the non-breaching party in
as good a position as if the contract had
been performed.
Alexander v. Brownf 646 P.2d 692
(Utah 1982).
In a case alleging a breach of a contract to procure
insurance, the inquiry is to find the actual damage or lost
caused to the non-breaching party.
Generally, assuming sufficient interest or
other recognized consideration, or where one
agrees to procure the issuance of insurance
on a property of another, affording protection against designated risks, and fails
to do so, he will be held liable, within the
amount of the proposed insurance, for the
loss attributed to his default.
Couch on Insurance 2d §74:54.
The party who undertakes an obligation to procure
insurance does not, himself, become an insurer.

Redmond v.

Petty Motor Co., 242 P.2d 302 (Utah 1952).

None of the special

duties imposed on an insurer apply to him.

His liability upon

breaching that contract is to pay the actual damages incurred
and nothing more.

Schell v. Knickelbein, 252 N.W.2d 921.

The importance of the distinction that Airport
Shuttle is a partnership of two private individuals and is not
an insurance company cannot be over-emphasized.

In many

reported decisions dealing with a breach of contract to procure
insurance, this distinction is of little or no consequence and

is glossed over by the courts.

However, in this case as in

others, the distinction is critical.
In the case of Bentley v. Fayas, 50 N.W.2d 404 (Wis.
1951), the court emphasized this point as follows:
The liability of one who breaches a contract
to procure insurance as to pay damages, and
is not that of an insurer. In many fact
situations, the end result of the amount with
which the party guilty of the breach may be
required to pay to the party sustaining the
loss would be the same, whichever of the two
theories of liability be adopted. However,
in situations like the instant case, radically different results would be obtained,
depending on which of the two theories be
adopted. It is therefore essential that the
correct theory of liability be applied here.
50 N.W.2d at page 409.
See also the case of Klonis v. Armstrong, 436 S.2d
213 (Fla. 1983).

In the Klonis case, plaintiffs carried a

homeowner's policy through their insurance agent, Armstrong.
After the inception of the policy, plaintiffs attempted to
obtain a special policy through agent Armstrong for the
insurance of listed property.

This policy would have been

primary insurance on the property.

Armstrong attempted to

obtain this insurance through Lloyds of London, but failed. The
property involved was stolen.

The homeowner's carrier paid for

part of the loss and attempted to subrogate against the agent
for his negligent conduct in attempting to get the Lloyds'
policy, which would have saved them from any loss.
court rejected this contention stating as follows:
Consolidated also argues that Armstrong
became, in effect, a primary insurance

The Florida

carrier by virtue of his unfulfilled promise
to secure the primary insurance coverage and,
therefore, became liable to Consolidated upon
equitable subrogation principles . . . But
this argument is likewise based upon an
erroneous premise, i.e., that Armstrong's
legal obligation to Klonis was equivalent to
the insurance contract made by a primary
insurance carrier. Armstrong's liability was
not co-extensive with the Lloyd's policy
originally issued and then later cancelled.
On the contrary, Armstrong's liability was
for damages resulting from his negligence or
breach of contract in failing to obtain
insurance coverage.
436 S.2d at page 217.
B. THE ASSIGNMENT OF HOLIDAY'S RIGHT OF ACTION
AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE CANNOT INCREASE ANY CLAIM THAT HOLIDAY
MAY HAVE HAD AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE.
In the instant case, Holiday has chosen to assign its
right of action against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff.

The

mere fact of this assignment cannot in any way increase or vary
the size or character of Airport Shuttle's obligation to
Holiday.

To the contrary, an assignment does not change the

breaching party's obligation whatsoever.
In the case of Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah
1963), this court considered a matter involving the assignment
of a right to recover for real estate broker's commissions.
Questions were raised as to the scope of rights the assignee
received.

This court commented:
It is elementary that plaintiff Cheney,
assignee of Real Estate Exchange, could
nothing more than its assignors, and is
by any waiver, relinquishment or change

as
have
bound
of

rights which had occurred by virtue of its
execution of the new agreement.
381 P.2d at page 91.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Holiday
suffered damage of $15f000.00 by virtue of a lack of liability
insurance covering it for plaintiff's claims. Clearly, having
expended no more than $15f000.00f Holiday's claim against
Airport Shuttle is restricted to that amount.
Under the rationale of the Cheney case, supra,
plaintiff, as the assignee of Holiday stands in the shoes of
Holiday.

Plaintiff can take no more than Holiday had and is

similarly restricted to the $15,000.00 figure.
C. PLAINTIFF HAS NO DIRECT CAUSE OF ACTION IN HER
OWN RIGHT AGAINST AIRPORT SHUTTLE. AIRPORT SHUTTLE'S LIABILITY
IN THIS CASE IS TIED SOLELY TO THAT OF HOLIDAY. PLAINTIFF,
HAVING RELEASED HOLIDAY, DAMAGES ARE LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT PAID
FOR THAT RELEASE.
Plaintiff's complaint pleads cause of action only
against Holiday.

Plaintiff has asserted no cause of action in

her own right as against Airport Shuttle.

Indeed, the

undisputed fact is that plaintiff was an employee of Airport
Shuttle and her only right of recovery against them would be
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Laws.
It is further undisputed that plaintiff has finally
and fully settled her case with Holiday upon payment of
$15,000.00 and the assignment of Holiday's rights against
Airport Shuttle.

The Release of All Claims against the sole

tort-feasor cuts off any right plaintiff might have to increase
her claim.
The case of Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc., 493
P.2d 624 (Utah 1972) involved a somewhat similar situation. In
the Holmstead case, plaintiff claimed personal injuries
resulting from an automobile accident.

Defendant's vehicle was

driven by Gideon Allen in the course and scope of his employment for defendant.

Prior to the filing of the action,

plaintiff made a settlement with Mr. Allen for his insurance
policy limits of $10,000.00. The settlement was handled under
a covenant not to sue.

Plaintiff attempted to expressly

reserve rights against Abbott GM Diesel.

Plaintiff then

proceeded to file a complaint against Abbott GM Diesel.
Abbott GM Diesel filed a motion for summary judgment
on the basis of the settlement between plaintiff and Allen.
Abbott GM argued that since it was not a joint tort-feasor, but
rather was only vicariously reliable for Allen's negligence,
the covenant not to sue, which in essence released Allen, must
also release Abbott GM.

The district court denied this motion.

On appeal, this court reversed.
The court reasoned that since Abbott GM's liability,
if any, to plaintiff was based entirely on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, and since Mr. Allen had effectively been
released by his settlement, that no cause of action can be
brought against Abbott GM.

The mere fact that plaintiff had

attempted to retain her cause of action against Abbott GM

through wording in the agreement with Mr. Allen was not
controlling.
Similarly, in the instant case, the liability of
Airport Shuttle is only for that negligence and liability that
may be assessed against Holiday.

Holiday, having been

effectively released by a covenant not to sue, upon payment of
$15,000.00, Airport Shuttle cannot be liable for more than that
amount.
D. AIRPORT SHUTTLE PARKING IS LIABLE ONLY FOR THE
ACTUAL DAMAGE INCURRED BY HOLIDAY OF $15,000.00, AND NOT FOR
THE CONTRIVED SHAM JUDGMENT OF $246,000.00.
In the instant case, plaintiff is attempting to
enforce a huge stipulated judgment which is subject to a
covenant not to execute in favor of a judgment debtor against
two private individuals who do not compose an insurance
company.
Plaintiff's brief herein, cites a lengthy string of
cases purporting to support this proposition.

However, none of

plaintiff's cited cases involve the instant situation.
Plaintiff's cases can generally be divided into
two groups.

Some of the cases involve a breach of contract to

procure insurance.

But none of these cases involve a contrived

judgment subject to a covenant not to execute in favor of the
tort-feasor.
Some of plaintiff's other cases involve a stipulated
judgment and a covenant not to execute.

But each of these

cases is an action against an insurer that has abandoned its

insured, not a breach of a contract to provide insurance.
Plaintiff asks this court to extend the concept of stipulated
settlements subject to covenants not to execute beyond the
bounds to which any court has previously extended it.
The first group of plaintiff's cases, those in which
a contract to procure insurance is involved but no special
judgment and covenant appears is typified by the case of Wiles
v. Mullinaxf 148 S.E.2d 229 (N.Caro. 1966).
In the Wiles case, plaintiff contacted defendant, an
insurance broker, and requested the issuance of certain
Workmen's Compensation insurance.

Defendant agreed to provide

the insurance, but failed to do so. After an accident
occurred, then plaintiff was forced to spend a total of
$9,300.00 in compensation and legal fees that would have been
covered, plaintiff sued defendant.

There was no questions in

this case that plaintiff was suing for the actual dollar amount
expended and not for a contrived sham and excessive judgment.
There was no question that plaintiff had direct liability to
pay these amounts, and that they had been paid.

The North

Carolina Court recognized the rule that one who contracts to
procure insurance and fails to do so to the detriment of the
other party, the contract is obligated to repay that party's
damages arising therefrom.
In a similar vein, see the case of Rieth-Riley
Construction v. Auto Owners Mutual Insurance, 408 N.E.2d 640
(Ind. 1980).

The Rieth-Riley case involved a lease agreement

pursuant to which a Mr. Hunt leased a,truck to Rieth-Riley
Construction.

Under the terms of the lease, Rieth-Riley was

obligated to provide liability insurance for the truck.
Rieth-Riley failed to obtain the insurance.
When an accident occurred injuring a third party, the
truck owner was sued.

The owner's insurance carrier paid

$100,000.00 in settlement of the action.

The insurance company

then filed an action against Reith-Riley seeking subrogation
for the $100,000.00 payment on the grounds that Rieth-Riley had
been obligated to procure public liability insurance and had
failed to do so.

Once again, the case did not involve any

contrived settlements or "covenants not to execute" connected
with stipulated judgments.

To the contrary, the amounts

involved had been paid in full as an obligation of the truck
owner.
The only cases cited by plaintiff in which a stipulated judgment subject to a "covenant not to execute" was
upheld against the third-party, were cases where an insurer was
involved and had improperly failed to meet its duty to defend
its insured.

While Airport Shuttle disagrees with the approach

taken in these cases, and cites the court to contrary
authority, infra, it is clear that these cases do not apply to
the situation of Airport Shuttle as a non-insurer.
Each of these cases reflect distinctions from the
instant case, such as the determination of damages by a judge
or jury rather than by stipulation, the actual payment of

damages or a part of them, etc., each of the cases emphasizes
the stringent obligations upon the defendant as an insurer
arising from its duty to defend under its policy and its duty
to handle an adjust the case in good faith.

See, for example,

Critz v. Farmers' Insurance Group, 230 Cal.App. 2d 788, 12
A.L.R. 3d 1142 (Cal. 1964), which bases its finding on the
breach of insurer's duty to settle in good faith; Metcalf v.
Hartford, 126 N.W.2d 471 (Neb. 1964), based upon a breach of a
duty to defend, and First National Indemnity v. Mercado, 511
S.W.2d (Tex. 1974), breach of duty to defend.
The importance of this distinction is emphasized by
the case of Deblon v. Beaton, 247 A.2d 172 (N.Jer. 1968) as
cited and quoted by plaintiff in her brief.

The New Jersey

court stated:
Thus, Jersey argues that plaintiff is
precluded because of its liability under its
policy is "to pay on behalf of the insured,
all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages" and its
insured cannot become "legally obligated to
pay" anything because of the covenant not to
sue. Such a conclusion might be tenable if
the policy was one of indemnity against loss,
rather than insurance against liability.
247 A.2d at p. 175 (Emphasis
added).
Airport Shuttle submits that in the instant case, its
obligation is akin to that of indemnity.

It is not a

liability.
Plaintiff's brief places special emphasis on the case
of Municipal Service Real Estate Company v. D.B.M. Holding

Corp., a Nat'l Sugar Refining Co, of New Jersey, 178 N.E. 745
(N.Y. 1931).
randum.

This case is misdescribed in plaintiff's memo-

The case involved a case in defects and title to

property.

The plaintiff's sued D.B.M., from whom they had

purchased the property under warranties of title under their
deed.

D.B.M. wished to plead in National Sugar Refining, who

had conveyed the premises to them with the same warranties of
title.

National Sugar, therefore, was not sued directly by

plaintiff.

Nevertheless, they attempted to interpose

defenses relating to the claim between defendant and plaintiff.
The case was brought to the New York Court of Appeals
on certified questions as to whether, under the particular
rules and statutes in effect at that time, National Sugar could
raise these defenses.

The court determined that the defenses

could not be raised by the third-party and remanded the case.
No contrived judgment, stipulated judgment or covenant not to
execute was involved.
In commenting on the decision, the court held:
The statute does not provide expressly or by
fair implication, that a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff against one defendant shall
constitute a binding adjudication against the
third person brought in as an additional
party defendant. It provides only for such
judgment against the additional defendant as
"may be proper."
A "proper judgment" is, of course, a judgment
rendered in accordance with due process of
law after a trial in which a party against
whom the judgment is rendered has had fair
opportunity to present his evidence or
defense in answer to the claim which is
adjudicated against him. The statute

contemplates that the claim by the original
defendant against the indemnator shall be
alleged in a supplemental pleading.
178 N.E. at page 746 (emphasis
added).
Thus, the municipal service case make it clear that a
11

set-up" stipulated judgment is not contemplated.

The case

stands solidly for the proposition that damage awards are to be
fairly litigated by a fair trial on the merits.
Plaintiff further places reliance on the Utah case of
Ammerman v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 460 (Utah
1969).

This reliance is not well-founded.

The Ammerman case

involved an automobile injury in which plaintiff sued defendant Soliz.

Soliz had an insurance policy with Farmers with

limits of $10,000.00. After the case was filed, plaintiff
offered to settle for $9,000.00.

Farmers rejected the offer.

The case went to trial and a jury verdict was returned of
$15,282.00.

Farmers paid its $10,000.00 limit and left Soliz

with an excess judgment of $5,282.00. At this point, Soliz
entered into an agreement with plaintiff, pursuant to which he
agreed to cooperate in seeking to have Farmers satisfy the
excess and plaintiff agreed they would not execute on the
judgment against him directly.
Plaintiff thereafter sued Farmers directly.

Farmers

was granted summary judgment on the theory that the agreement
with Soliz was in accord and satisfaction and eliminated all
liability including that of his insurer.

On appeal, this court

reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, determining that
no accord and satisfaction had been reached.
The Ammerman case is distinguishable from the instant
case in several important respects.

Firstf it involves a claim

against an insurance company sounding in bad faith under which
it is claimed that the insurance company failed to look out for
the interests of its insuredf and should have settled for
$9,000.00.
Second, it involves a damage amount set by jury
verdict and not by contract settlement in connection with a
covenant not to execute.
Third, it involves a situation where a judgment was
entered against the insured and was an actual liability against
him before any assignment of his right against his insurance
company was made.

As a consequence, the judgment was a valid

injury and damage to the insured.
Conversly, in the instant case, the $246,000.00
judgment freely stipulated to by Holiday was only entered and
agreed to after they had been released of all liability in this
case.

It was a voluntary assumption of liability as opposed to

a judicial decree of liability.

No jury or other fact-finder

was involved in the determination of the amount, whether it was
$1.00 or $1,000,000.00 made no difference to Holiday.
The law regarding the breach of contracts to procure
insurance is discussed, supra and clearly holds that private
individuals, such as Airport Shuttle are liable only for the

actual damages and detriment visited upon an aggrieved party
such as Holiday, they are not liable for the sham and contrived
judgments such as plaintiff would like to collect.
E. EVEN IF AIRPORT SHUTTLE WERE AN INSURANCE
COMPANY, THIS COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD CONTRIVED AND SHAM
JUDGMENTS.
There is a split of authority among the various
jurisdictions as to whether contrived settlements in which a
tort-feasor submits to a judgment for which he has no liability
and may be enforced against his insurance company.

Airport

Shuttle submits that the better reasoned line of cases rejects
such judgments as a sham in violation of due process determination of true and fair damages.

Dennis v. New Amsterdam

Casualty Co.f 264 A.2d 436 (Penn. 1970); Huffman v. Peerless
Ins. Co.y 193 S.E.2d 773 (N.Caro. 1973); Stubblefield v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 517 P.2d 262 (Ore. 1973);
Bendall v. White, 511 F.Supp. 793 (N.Dist. Ala. 1981); United
Fire Insurance Co. v. Lay, 577 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1978); Gatto
v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d 23 (111. 1975) and American
Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Hoge, 409 N.E.2d 24 (111.
1980) .
The underlying fault that each of these cases finds
with these contrived settlement agreements that the insured has
no obligation to pay the stipulated judgment.

The settlement

by the insured under circumstances which prevent any recovery
from him whatsoever, creates no legal obligation on his part.
To the contrary, the express terms of his settlement agreement

relieve him from any obligations.

The insurance policies

dealt with in these cases insure an individual against damages
which he shall become "legally obligated to pay."

The court's

analysis is straightforward in determining that a judgment for
which an insured is not "legally obligated" is not covered by
insurance.
The Stubblefield case is a good example and closely
analagous to the instant case.

In this case, Stubblefield, a

doctor, was sued by the husband of one of his patients for
criminal conversation and alienation of affections.
Stubblefield tendered the defense of the action to his malpractice insurer, St. Paul.

St. Paul refused to defend,

apparently on the ground that Stubblefield's actions

were

intentional and not covered by his policy.
Stubblefield went ahead and settled the action with
the plaintiff, under which a judgment for $50,000.00 was
entered against him.

However, prior to the entry of the

judgment, Stubblefield entered into an arrangement with plaintiff whereby he paid the total sum of $5,000.00, and received a
"covenant not to execute" which restricted plaintiff from
executing on the judgment against Stubblefield and required him
to go after the insurance company only.

Stubblefield also

executed an assignment of his rights against his insurance
company to plaintiff.

As the Oregon court has pointed out, it

is particularly important that Stubblefield entered into this

agreement and was fully protected before the entry of any
judgment.
The settlement agreement was substantially identical
to that in the instant case whereby Holiday paid a sum to
plaintiff in settlement of the action and assigned its rights
over and against Airport Shuttle to plaintiff.

Only then did

Holiday submit to the quarter million dollar judgment.
In ruling on the casef the Oregon Supreme Courtf
sitting en banc found the insurance company had no liability.
The court stated:
The insurance policy provided that "the
company will indemnify the insurer for all
sums which the insured shall be legally
obligated to pay as damages and expenses . .
. on account of . . . personal injury."
Assuming, without deciding that plaintiff
suffered "personal injuries" which were
within the coverage of the policy, the result
of the "separate covenant not to execute" was
the amount which the insured in this case was
"legally obligated" to pay to plaintiff as
damages for such personal injuries was the
sum of $5 ,000.00. The insured agreed,
however, to pay that amount himself and that
amount was expressly excluded from the
assignment and was reserved for the insured.
It follows that by the terms of the assignment in this case, plaintiff acquired no
rights which were enforceable by it against
defendant.
517 P.2d at page 270.
See also, the case of United State Fire Insurance Co.
v. Lay, supra.

This case involved a wrongful death action for

the death of Lay, resulting from a motor vehicle accident
involving a truck owned by Comador.

Comador had a $100,000.00

primary insurance policy and a $1 ,000,000.00 insurance policy.
In anticipation of the wrongful death action, the primary
insurer negotiated a settlement with plaintiffs for $70,000.00.
They granted release to the insured and the primary insurer
from any further payment as a result of judgment, but attempted
to retain a shot at the excess insurer for those amounts that
might be assessed by judgment in excess of $100,000.00.
(Plaintiff's were waiving the right to recover amounts between
$70,000.00 and $100,000.00.)
Plaintiff then proceeded to file a wrongful death
action against the insured.

The primary insurer purported to

appear and defend on behalf of the insured.

No litigation took

place and the parties stipulated to a judgment of $150,000.00.
Plaintiff then tried to collect the $50,000.00 against the
excess insurer.
The Seventh Circuit refused to accept the contrived
settlement and sham judgment.

The court commented:

It [Comador] was affectively released from
all liability in excess of $70,000.00 by that
settlement agreement executed before the
action against it was commenced. The agreed
judgment did not purport to impose liability
on Comador. Because Comador was not, and
could not be liable for an amount in excess
of $100,000.00, the obligation of the excess
carrier to indemnify Comador never arose.
It is argued on behalf of the administrix
that the excess policy is not a true indemnity policy because it does not require that
the insured actually pay the judgment before
liability attaches. See 7 J. Appleman
Insurance Law and Practice §7261 (1962).
Whether or not the policy is one of indemnity
and technical sense, it is in substance, a

contract for indemnity against liability.
The obligation to pay does not arise until
the insured becomes liable. The excess
carrier has no obligation whatsoever unless
and until the insured becomes liable.
* * *

Moreover, the settlement agreement terminating Comador's liability to the administrix
made her subsequent wrongful death action
against Comador a sham. Burkett v. Crulo
Trucking Company, Inc., Ind.App. 355 N.E.2d
253 (1976). Neither Comador nor the primary
insurer which purported to defend the action,
had any interest whatsoever in the outcome.
577 F.2d at page 423.
Similarly, in the instant case, Holiday's exposure
for damages was terminated by its settlement agreement and
payment of $15,000.00. The further entry of the sham judgment
and other proceedings cannot effect the obligation of Airport
Shuttle whatsoever.
This court has not specifically considered the
validity of a contrived settlement of this type, even when it
is alleged against an insurer.
Chambers, 657 P.2d 279

However, in the case of Lima v.

(Utah, 1982), this court recognized

the danger of sham and inflated judgments being awarded in
third-party proceedings and then asserted against insurance

The Lima case involved a situation where plaintiff
was injured in a motor vehicle accident by an uninsured driver,
Chambers.

Chambers appeared pro se.

uninsured motor carrier for plaintiff.

Prudential was the
Plaintiff's attorney

obtained an affidavit from Chambers to the effect that he was

liable for the accident and proposed to proceed against him in
order to secure a large judgment.

Plaintiff then antici-

pated turning to Prudential for payment of the judgment.

The

issue came to this court on Prudential's right to intervene in
the lawsuit and affirmatively defend on Chambers' behalf.
This court recognized the danger of allowing a party
to "set-up" an insurance company by proceeding to a judgment
which would be asserted against the insurance company and
without allowing the insured to participate in the liability
and damage assessment.
These issues are closely analagous to those involved
in the present situation.

It is clear that the interest of

Airport Shuttle and those of the party it must indemnify were
highly divergent at the time of settlement.

Holiday's primary

interest was not to minimize the judgment involved or even
negotiate it in good faith, but rather to stipulate to whatever
inflated judgment plaintiff might desire in order to secure a
covenant not to execute. As the judgment entered by Judge
Fishier on October 1, 1982 indicates, Airport Shuttle's
attorney was present during these proceedings but was denied
standing in participation.
The danger of allowing such a continued, set-up
settlements subject to covenants not to execute is readily
apparent.

Such settlements run counter to the fair adjudi-

cation of legitimate claims.

POINT III
JUDGE DANIELS1 DETERMINATION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Judge Daniels1 order in this case granted Airport
Shuttle's motion for summary judgment which necessarily
required a denial of plaintiff's motion.
determination is fully brief supra.

The basis of that

Nevertheless, additional

legal foundation is present for the denial of plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment which were not reached by Judge Daniels
due to his ruling on the motion for Airport Shuttle.
THE CONTRIVED JUDGMENT ENTERED INTO BY HOLIDAY AND
PLAINTIFF IS EXCESSIVE ON ITS FACE AND A PATENT SHAM.
Airport Shuttle submits that the stipulated judgment
of $246,000.00 in favor of plaintiff against Holiday Rent-A-Car
herein is clearly excessive from a brief overview of the facts
before the court.

This case involves medical specials at the

time of settlement, totalling approximately $5,Q00.00f which
had been primarily incurred for psychiatric treatment and
physical therapy.

Plaintiff had an off and on work history

prior to the accident and immediately prior had been employed
for just six weeks at a job paying minimum wage.

(Tr. 23.)

Plaintiff suffered no broken bones, no nerve impairment, no
disc injury, and had been diagnosed by at least one of her
doctors as suffering from psychosomatic pain.

Airport Shuttle

submits that the court may take judicial notice that a settlement of approximately a quarter million dollars in the face of

such evidence is most unusual and bears a substantial taint of
collusion.
Even in those cases cited by plaintiffs supporting
stipulated judgments against insurance companies, it is clearly
stated that such stipulated judgments shall be upheld only if
obtained without fraud or collusion.

Metcalf v. Hartford

Accident & Indemnity Co., supra Coblentz v. American Surety
£o., 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969).
In the instant case, the claimed settlement figure is
totally disproportionate to the medical special damages
involved.

At the pre-trial settlement conference held before

Judge Croft on August 13, 1982, plaintiff's initial settlement
demand was approximately one-third of this stipulated amount.
A review of the facts of this settlement further
indicates its collusive nature.

Under the settlement, plain-

tiff relieved Holiday from liability for any damages in
exchange for the payment of $15,000.00. What was plaintiff's
motivation for this act?

If, in fact, as is claimed, plaintiff

believed the case was worth substantially more than this
amount, why would they agree to accept just $15,000.00 from the
responsible party?

Why would plaintiff not proceed with her

case against both parties and get the judgment she thought she
was entitled to?

Airport Shuttle submits that the settlement

was not motivated by charitable considerations plaintiff had
towards Holiday.

Rather, the clear motivation was to secure a

$15,000.00 settlement for plaintiff and then attempt to

"set-up" Airport Shuttle for a collusive and excessive settlement figure.
At a minimum, it is apparent that there are significant facts at issue regarding the collusive nature of this
settlement.

As pointed out in Point IV of Airport Shuttle's

reply memorandum in the court below, Airport Shuttle, at a
minimum, is entitled to an opportunity to conduct discovery and
participate in an open hearing as to the reasons and foundations for the quarter million dollar figure.

Specifically,

such discovery will require depositions from those attorneys
and parties participating in the settlement as to the information available to them and as to why plaintiff had been
prepared to settle for $85,000.00 or less a month and a half
prior to the entry of this judgment and Holiday only offered a
combined amount of $15,000.00 and then a month and a half later
the parties agreed to a judgment of $246,000.00.
CONCLUSION
This case, which began as a straightforward personal
injury action has been contorted and confused by a settlement
agreement designed to give plaintiff a windfall judgment
against Rex Howell and Harold Hinckley, dba Airport Shuttle.
However, a review of that settlement agreement makes
clear that the total exposure and the loss suffered by Holiday
in this matter is $15,000.00. As such, Holiday's damage
arising from a lack of insurance coverage in this case, is in
the amount of $15,000.00. Any assignment or machination of

Holiday and plaintiff cannot increase the damage suffered or
the exposure.
Airport Shuttle's liability to Holiday for the breach
of contract of procured insurance is restricted to the actual
damages Holiday has incurred.

Those damages being in the

amount of $15f000.00, Judge Daniels' award of summary judgment
was accordingly entered.
The fact that Holiday Rent-A-Car, after signing its
settlement agreement and receiving a covenant not to execute
chose, voluntarily, without obligation under its agreements,
elected to stipulate to a judgment for almost a quarter million
dollars as against itself can have no effect whatsoever on the
obligations of Airport Shuttle herein.
Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, dba Airport Shuttle
are not an insurance company and did not and could not enter
into a contract directly insuring Holiday.

These gentlemen had

none of the special duties which are imposed by law on
insurance companies such as the duty to defend, the duty to
settle in good faith, etc.
Airport Shuttle conducted its defense in this action
in the only way reasonably possible.

That is, it prepared to

go forward with trial with plaintiff and Holiday.

While

Airport Shuttle retained its defensive claims against Holiday,
it was prepared and ready to go forward and assist in the
defense of plaintiff's primary cause of action against Holiday.
This position and orderly conduct of litigation thwarted by a

collusive settlement between plaintiff and defendant in an
effort to "set-up" Airport Shuttle for a huge judgment.

As a

consequence of this settlement, plaintiff's case has never
been tried on the merits and

plaintiff is attempting to

collect the grossly excessive judgment against Airport Shuttle,
Such an effort is contrary to the fair adjudication
of justice and should not be countenanced by this court.
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